Recent empirical research has found that high-skill individuals tend to be less risk averse than low-skill individuals, which implies that their respective constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions have di¤erent curvature. This paper examines the e¤ects of this form of preference heterogeneity on the classic question of whether taxing savings is desirable when the government also implements optimal nonlinear income taxation. It is shown that taxing or subsidising savings may be optimal, even if labour is separable from consumption in the utility function. Speci…cally, if the individuals'discount rate is lower (resp. higher) than the market interest rate, it is optimal to tax (resp. subsidise) savings. If the individuals'discount rate is equal to the market interest rate, zero taxation of savings is optimal. This basic relationship holds under both linear and nonlinear taxation of savings.
Introduction
In a pioneering study, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that commodity taxation is redundant if individuals share the same preferences, labour is separable from commodities in the utility function, and the government can implement optimal nonlinear income taxation. 1 If di¤erent commodities are interpreted as consumption in di¤erent time periods, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result implies that savings should not be taxed under their assumptions. It follows, however, that savings taxation may be desirable if preferences are heterogeneous, and the purpose of this paper is to explore this possibility in greater detail. The type of preference heterogeneity we consider is that in which high-skill individuals are less risk averse than low-skill individuals, which implies greater curvature of the latter type's utility function. Speci…cally, we assume that high-skill and low-skill individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, with high-skill individuals having a lower coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical work of Dohmen, et al. (2010) , who …nd a strong and signi…cant inverse relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. Allowing for this form of preference heterogeneity in an otherwise standard optimal tax model, 2 we show that taxing or subsidising savings may be optimal, while maintaining the assumptions that labour is separable from consumption in the utility function and that the government uses optimal nonlinear income taxation. Thus without preference heterogeneity in our model, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result of zero savings taxation would apply.
Although our optimal tax results are generally ambiguous, we show that savings should be taxed or subsidised depending upon a simple relationship between the individuals'discount rate and the market interest rate: if the individuals'discount rate is lower (resp. higher) than the market interest rate, it is optimal to tax (resp. subsidise) savings. If the individuals'discount rate is equal to the market interest rate, zero taxation of savings is optimal. This relationship is shown to hold under both linear and 1 See also Mirrlees (1976) and Christiansen (1984) which are other early papers that examine optimal commodity and income taxation. 2 That is, we use the workhorse nonlinear income tax model of Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1982) , extended to two periods to allow for savings taxation. nonlinear taxation of savings. The intuition for the cases of linear and nonlinear savings taxation is di¤erent and is explained in detail below, but the basic reasoning common to both tax systems can be summarised as follows. If the individuals'discount rate is lower than the market interest rate, then both high-skill and low-skill individuals have a relatively strong preference for savings. However, since high-skill individuals have less curvature in their utility function, their marginal utility of savings is higher, which translates into a stronger preference for savings. Then by the arguments in the existing literature for taxing commodities preferred by the higher-skilled, taxing savings is optimal. By a reverse argument, subsidising savings is optimal if the individuals'discount rate is higher than the market interest rate, and zero taxation of savings is optimal if the individuals'discount rate and the market interest rate are equal.
To the best of our knowledge, no other papers consider the implications of heterogeneous CRRA preferences for using savings taxation alongside nonlinear income taxation. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our model and assumptions. Section 3 examines optimal linear taxation of savings, while Section 4 examines optimal nonlinear taxation of savings. Section 5 conducts some numerical simulations, while Section 6 discusses the e¤ects of extending our model to also incorporate heterogeneity in the individuals'discount factors. Section 7 concludes, while proofs and some other mathematical details are contained in an appendix.
Preliminaries
We consider a two-period model in which individuals work and save in period 1, and then High-skill and low-skill individuals are also distinguished by their preferences. The utility function of every high-skill individual is:
while that for every low-skill individual is:
where c t i denotes type i's consumption in period t, l i denotes type i's labour supply, =
1+
where 2 (0; 1) is both types discount factor and > 0 is both types discount rate, and the function v( ) is increasing and convex. Since individuals do not work in period 2, c 2 i = (1 + r)s i where s i is type i's savings and r > 0 is the market interest rate, which is …xed by the assumption of a linear production technology. It can be seen that the utility functions are of the CRRA form, where > 0 is the high-skill type's coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, while > 0 is that for the low-skill type. 4 Based on the empirical evidence presented in Dohmen, et al. (2010) , we assume that > which re ‡ects their …nding that low-skill individuals are more risk averse than high-skill individuals. 5 Finally, we assume that the parameters of the model are such that c t i > 1 in order to avoid the problem that (c 
subject to their budget constraint:
4 If or happen to be equal to one, the utility function becomes logarithmic in consumption. 5 We assume a perfect correlation between skills and preferences to avoid the di¢ culties involved in solving multi-dimensional screening problems. Golosov, et al. (2010) also make this simplifying assumption. Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011) allow for an imperfect correlation, but they assume that taxation is based on skill di¤erences alone. Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010) do address the multidimensional screening problem, predominantly using numerical methods.
where z = for high-skill individuals and z = for low-skill individuals, and q = 1 + where is the tax on savings (with a negative tax being a subsidy). The solution to programme (3:1) (3:2) yields type i's indirect utility function V i (q; m i ;
) and their demand for savings s i (q; m i ).
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The government chooses the tax on savings and the nonlinear income tax system to maximise social welfare. That is, the government chooses , hy L ; m L i, and hy H ; m H i to maximise the utilitarian social welfare function:
subject to:
where equation (3.4) is the government's budget constraint, and equation (3.5) is the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. We omit the low-skill type's incentivecompatibility constraint, as we focus on the case normally studied in the literature in which the redistributive aims of the government imply that high-skill individuals have an incentive to mimic low-skill individuals, but not vice versa. Accordingly, the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will bind at an optimum, whereas the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will be slack.
It is shown in the Appendix that the solutions to programmes (3:1) (3:2) and (3:3) (3:5) yield the follow result:
Proposition 1 Under optimal linear taxation of savings and optimal nonlinear taxation of labour income when high-skill individuals are less risk averse than low-skill individuals:
Therefore, the sign of the optimal linear tax applicable to savings is generally am- 6 The assumption that labour is separable from consumption in the utility function implies that the demand for savings is independent of labour supply.
biguous, but it is determined by a simple relationship between the individuals'discount rate and the market interest rate. If < r so that the individuals'discount rate is lower than the market interest rate, both types of individual are relatively patient and therefore both have a relatively strong preference for savings. But since the high-skill type's utility function has less curvature, their marginal utility of savings is higher, so they save more. Speci…cally, a 'mimicking' high-skill individual, i.e., a high-skill individual who chooses the tax treatment intended for low-skill individuals, saves more than the truly low-skilled even though both have the same income. In this case, a tax on savings hurts the mimicker more than the truly low-skilled. Taxing savings therefore deters mimicking behaviour or, equivalently, relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint, which enables the government to increase social welfare. By a reverse argument, subsidising savings is optimal if > r, because in this case a mimicking high-skill individual saves less than a low-skill individual. If = r, zero taxation of savings is optimal, because the mimicker and low-skill individuals have the same savings; thus taxation or subsidisation of savings cannot help relax the incentive-compatibility constraint.
Optimal Nonlinear Savings Taxation
Consider …rst individual behaviour in the absence of taxation. Individual i will choose c 1 i , s i , l i , and c 2 i to maximise utility:
subject to the budget constraints:
where, as before, z = for high-skill individuals and z = for low-skill individuals. It is shown in the Appendix that the …rst-order conditions corresponding to programme (4:1) (4:3) can be manipulated to yield the marginal condition:
Now suppose that individuals face nonlinear taxation of their savings and income.
As it may be optimal for the government to set taxes in a manner such that condition (4.4) is violated, one may de…ne the 'tax wedge'or 'implicit marginal tax rate'applicable to type i's savings as:
where M T RS i denotes the marginal tax rate on savings faced by type i individuals.
Optimal nonlinear taxation of savings and income can be modelled as the government choosing allocations hy L ; m L ; s L i and hy H ; m H ; s H i for the low-skill and high-skill individuals, respectively, to maximise the utilitarian social welfare function:
where
is the government's budget constraint, and equation (4.8) is the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. 7 It is shown in the Appendix that the solution to programme (4:6) (4:8) yields:
Proposition 2 Under optimal nonlinear taxation of savings and income when high-skill individuals are less risk averse than low-skill individuals:
The …nding that high-skill individuals face a zero marginal tax rate on their savings is simply an example of the 'no-distortion-at-the-top'result that is common in optimal nonlinear income tax models. The sign of the marginal tax rate applicable to the lowskill type's savings is generally ambiguous, but like under linear savings taxation it is determined by a simple relationship between the individuals' discount rate and the market interest rate. However, the intuition is now a little di¤erent. If < r, then all individuals have a relatively strong preference for savings. But unlike under linear savings taxation, low-skill individuals and a mimicking high-skill individual have the exact same savings, as both choose the low-skill type's allocation. However, a positive marginal tax rate on the low-skill type's savings hurts the mimicker more, because the mimicker has a higher marginal utility of savings owing to less curvature in their utility function. Thus distorting the low-skill type's savings downwards through a positive marginal tax rate deters mimicking behaviour and relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint. Analogously, if > r then distorting the low-skill type's savings upwards through a negative marginal tax rate is optimal to deter mimicking, and if = r a zero marginal tax rate on the low-skill type's savings is optimal since, in this case, distorting savings cannot help deter mimicking.
Numerical Simulations
To further expose the e¤ects of heterogeneous CRRA preferences on optimal savings taxation, we conduct some numerical simulations. The parameters of the model are chosen on the following basis. Chetty (2006) concludes that a reasonable estimate of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is one (log utility). We therefore take this as our starting point, and consider parameter values such that > 1 > , with arbitrarily chosen baseline values of = 1:1 and = 0:9. For simplicity we assume that v(l i ) = l i , so that utility is quasi-linear in labour. The OECD (2011) reports that 30% of adults across OECD countries have attained tertiary level education. Accordingly, we assume that 30% of the population are high-skill individuals, i.e., = 0:3. Fang (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2007) estimate that the college wage premium is around 60%. We therefore assume that w L = 2:5 and w H = 4:0.
8 Following common practice, we assume an annual market interest rate of 4% (r = 0:04), and we consider values of the individuals'discount rate such that T 0:04. Since we examine a two-period model, we assume that each period is 20 years in length and work with the twenty-year analogs of the annual market interest rate and the individuals'discount rate. The baseline parameter values that we use in the numerical simulations are reported in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ects of changes in some key parameters on the optimal linear savings tax rate , while holding all other parameters at their baseline levels.
Simulations are conducted for < r ( = 0:0395), = r ( = 0:04), and > r ( = 0:0405). 9 The top panel of Figure 1 con…rms Proposition 1: if < r then is positive and increasing in the degree of preference heterogeneity; if > r then is negative and decreasing in the degree of preference heterogeneity; and if = r then is always equal to zero. The middle panel of Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of increasing the degree of wage inequality. As wage inequality increases, it becomes optimal for the government to engage in more redistribution, which strengthens the incentive high-skill individuals have to mimic low-skill individuals. Accordingly, when 6 = r, it is optimal to move further away from zero as savings taxation/subsidisation is used more intensely to deter mimicking. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of changing the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy. An increase in has two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, an increase in means that high-skill individuals obtain more weight in the social welfare function, which reduces the extent of redistribution that the government wants to undertake. On the other hand, an increase in raises the economy's endowments and makes redistribution less costly, thus strengthening the government's desire to redistribute. For the empirically-plausible parameter values that we consider, the second e¤ect dominates. Therefore, when 6 = r, the optimal level of moves further away from zero as increases, in order to facilitate redistribution by 8 It would be more natural to normalise the low-skill type's wage to unity and correspondingly set the high-skill type's wage equal to 1.6. However, we choose w L = 2:5 and w H = 4:0 to ensure that c t i > 1 in all of our numerical simulations. 9 We consider small di¤erences in the annual market interest rate and the individuals'discount rate, because these imply relatively large di¤erences over the 20-year horizon.
deterring mimicking. Figure 2 shows the e¤ects of parameter changes on optimal nonlinear savings taxation; speci…cally, on the optimal marginal tax rate applicable to the low-skill type's savings. As expected, the simulation results are qualitatively the same as those for linear savings taxation, as is the intuition underlying the results.
Extension: Heterogeneous Discount Rates
In light of the empirical evidence that suggests high-skill individuals are more patient than low-skill individuals, and the related literature which has focused on this case, we consider an extension of our model to incorporate this second source of preference heterogeneity. We assume that H > L , or equivalently H < L , so that high-skill individuals have a higher discount factor (or lower discount rate) than low-skill individuals.
With this extension, the analogues to Propositions 1 and 2 are:
Proposition 1a Under optimal linear taxation of savings and optimal nonlinear taxation of labour income when high-skill individuals are less risk averse and more patient than low-skill individuals:
Proposition 2a Under optimal nonlinear taxation of savings and income when highskill individuals are less risk averse and more patient than low-skill individuals:
The proofs of Propositions 1a and 2a are provided in the Appendix, but the intuition underlying these results is fairly straightforward. If high-skill individuals are more patient than low-skill individuals, then the former always have a stronger preference for savings. It therefore becomes optimal, ceteris paribus, to tax savings. Thus in Propositions 1a and 2a for each possible relationship between L and r, 10 the optimal tax on savings is simply increased relative to that in Propositions 1 and 2 for the corresponding relationship between and r. 11 Therefore, the intuition behind Propositions 1a and 2a
is the same as that behind Propositions 1 and 2, except that the stronger preference high-skill individuals now have for savings strengthens the case for taxing savings.
Conclusion
Following the pioneering work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , an extensive literature has arisen which examines the robustness of their zero commodity taxation result. This paper joins this literature by considering the e¤ects of individuals having di¤erent CRRA utility functions, which is motivated by empirical evidence that suggests high-skill individuals are less risk averse than low-skill individuals. Our main result is that savings taxation or subsidisation may now be optimal, depending upon a simple relationship between the individuals'discount rate and the market interest rate. Interestingly, this simple relationship holds under both linear and nonlinear taxation of savings.
A number of potential extensions of our paper come to mind. As is common in the literature, we have assumed a linear production technology which …xes wages and the market interest rate. Since our results depend upon the relationship between the individuals'discount rate and the market interest rate, it may be interesting to extend our model to a setting in which the market interest rate is endogenous. Likewise, to maintain consistency with the existing literature, we have assumed that there is no uncertainty. Given our focus on heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion, an extension incorporating uncertainty might be worth pursuing. Another possible extension would be to relax the assumption that there is a perfect correlation between skills and preferences.
However, optimal nonlinear taxation would then become a multi-dimensional screening problem, and such problems can be very di¢ cult to solve for clear-cut results.
Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian corresponding to programme (3:1) (3:2) is:
where i > 0 is the multiplier on individual i's budget constraint. The …rst-order conditions are:
These …rst-order conditions can be manipulated to yield:
where b s H denotes the savings of a mimicking high-skill individual.
For use below, note that by the Envelope Theorem we obtain:
) is the mimicker's indirect utility function, and b H > 0 is the multiplier on the mimicker's budget constraint. Also, equation (A.5) implies that:
The …rst-order conditions on , m L , and m H in programme (3:3) (3:5) are:
(1 )
where > 0 is the multiplier on the government's budget constraint (3.4) , and H > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint (3.5).
Adding equations (A.8), (A.9), and (A.10) after …rst multiplying equation (A.9) by s L and equation (A.10) by s H yields the following expression for the optimal linear tax on savings:
where use has been made of equation ( To show that = r =) = 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that = r and > 0. This is equivalent to having (1 + r) = 1 and q > 1, which using equation
and therefore
contradiction. Analogously, suppose that = r and < 0. This is equivalent to having
(1 + r) = 1 and q < 1, which using equation (A.7) implies:
To show that < r =) > 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that < r and 0. This is equivalent to having (1 + r)a = 1, where a 2 (0; 1), and q 1, which using equation (A.7) implies:
To show that > r =) < 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that > r and 0. This is equivalent to having (1 + r)b = 1, where b > 1, and q 1, which using equation (A.7) implies:
A.2 Derivation of Equation (4.4)
The relevant …rst-order conditions corresponding to programme (4:1) (4:3) are: 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The …rst-order condition on s L in programme (4:6) (4:8) is:
where H > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint (4.8).
Equation (A.19) can be manipulated to yield: .20) or using equation (4.5): 
which yields a contradiction. Analogously, suppose that = r and M T RS L < 0. This is equivalent to having (1 + r) = 1 and c 
which yields a contradiction.
To show that > r =) M T RS L < 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that > r and M T RS L 0. This is equivalent to having (1 + r) < 1 and c
Finally, the …rst-order condition on s H in programme (4:6) (4:8) is:
which using equation (4.5) implies that M T RS H = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1a
With heterogeneous discount factors, equation (A.7) becomes:
To show that L = r =) > 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that L = r and 0. This is equivalent to having L (1 + r) = 1 and q 1, which using equation
where use has been made of the fact that L = x H for some x 2 (0; 1). Therefore, s L < b s H which using equation (A.11) implies that > 0, yielding a contradiction.
To show that L < r =) > 0, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that L < r and 0. This is equivalent to having L (1 + r)a = 1, where a 2 (0; 1), and q 1, which using equation (A.23) implies:
Finally, L > r =) T 0 has been con…rmed using numerical examples, details of which are available upon request.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2a
With heterogeneous discount factors, equations (A.20) and (A.21) become: Optimal Linear Savings Taxation
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Optimal Nonlinear Savings Taxation
